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THE USE OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE INITIATIVES IN THE
BATTLE AGAINST OFFSHORE TAX EVASION
LEANDRA LEDERMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE individual income tax gap-the gap between taxes due and taxestimely and voluntarily paid-was recently estimated at $450 billion for
tax year 2006.1 That estimate does not break out international activity,2
but international tax noncompliance may be on the order of $100 billion
or more annually.3 The federal government is aware that some individuals
make use of bank accounts in overseas jurisdictions with bank secrecy laws
to evade federal taxes.4 Other U.S. taxpayers with offshore bank accounts
may inadvertently fail to comply with U.S. tax laws, which include a re-
quirement to report ownership of foreign accounts that have a balance of
over $10,000 during the year.5 Failure to report such an account gives rise
* William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, Indiana University Maurer School
of Law, Bloomington, IN, 1lederma@indiana.edu. The author is grateful to Craig
Boise, Leslie Book, Keith Fogg, Jordan Green, Susan Morse, and Bryan Skarlatos
for helpful comments; to Dick Harvey, Tracy Kaye, David Walker, participants in
the symposium, and participants in the 2012 Washburn Tax Colloquium for
helpful discussions; and to Tyler Hawkins, Jennifer Hepp, and Michele Roberts for
valuable research assistance.
1. See Tax Gap "Map" Tax Year 2006, I.R.S. (Dec. 2011), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/newsroom/taxgap-map_2006.pdf.
2. See id.; see also The Tax Gap and International Taxpayers, I.R.S. (Feb. 2008),
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/The-Tax-Gap-and-Intemational-Taxpayers
("[T]here is currently no specific data to indicate what portion of the tax gap is
attributable to international taxpayers .... Individual international taxpayers will
be included in [the National Research Program] for the first time in 2008 with the
examination of tax year 2006 returns."); TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX AD-
MIN., 2009-IE-ROO, A COMBINATION OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS AND INCREASED IRS
CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY ARE REQUIRED To REDUCE THE MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR
U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAx GAP (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/ie
reports/2009reports/2009IEROO1fr.html ("Non-IRS estimates of the international
tax gap range from $40 billion to $123 billion. While there might be overlap be-
tween the IRS tax gap estimate and the international tax gap, it is doubtful that the
$345 billion estimate includes the entire international tax gap.").
3. See PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.
AND Gov'T AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., TAx HAVEN BANKS AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 1
(2008), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/071708PSIReport.pdf.
4. See id. at 1-2.
5. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2006) ("Records and reports on foreign financial
agency transactions."); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350 (2011) ("Reports of foreign financial
accounts."); Report ofForeign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), I.R.S., http://www.
irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=148849,00.html (last updated Mar. 5,
2012); Ellen Wallace, U.S. Versus Switzerland Over Bank Details: New Battle Round
Opens (Update), GENEVALUNCH.COM (Sept. 5, 2011), http://genevalunch.com/
blog/2011/09/05/us-versus-switzerland-over-bank-details-new-battle-round-opens-
update ("The Fbar [sic] was originally designed as an anti-terrorism measure, but
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to information-return penalties, as well as to penalties on any unpaid
taxes.
The tax penalties include accuracy, delinquency and fraud penal-
ties that can range from 20% to 75% of the underpaid tax. In
addition, there are penalties for failure to file or falsely filing in-
formation returns such as . . . a Report of Foreign Bank Account
("FBAR"), and Forms 3520, 3520A, 5471, 5471, 926 and 8865.
Some of these information return penalties can be quite large.
For example, the penalty for willfully failing to file or falsely filing
a FBAR can be 50% of the amount in the unreported account
per year.6
Taxpayers who engage in intentional tax evasion typically do so by
disguising their ownership of the offshore assets and failing to report on
their tax returns ownership of the account or transactions in the account.
The United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations de-
scribed several examples, including the following:
Mr. [Robert] Holliday [a client of a promoter who authored a
how-to manual] transferred about $450,000 in untaxed income
to an Isle of Man shell corporation he controlled in payment for
non-existent feasibility studies. To make use of the funds placed
offshore, Mr. Holliday paid his bills using a credit card issued by
an offshore bank, directed the offshore companies to pay desig-
nated expenses, and instructed [his] Nevada [shell] companies
to borrow money from his offshore entities. These efforts al-
lowed Mr. Holliday to conceal his income from the IRS, while
enjoying control and use of the money.7
The federal government has engaged in a number of well-publicized
enforcement efforts in an attempt to collect back taxes owed on funds in
these accounts and encourage future compliance with the federal income
it has in the past two to three years surfaced as a tool to find assets that might have
slipped through the net."). Some tax attorneys have commented that many of their
clients had never heard of an FBAR before the government started cracking down
on FBAR noncompliance. David D. Stewart, IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program Gets
High Marks from Practitioners, So Far, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 3, 2009, at 169-3.
Some foreign residents were unaware even that they were U.S. citizens and thus
subject to U.S. tax laws. See IRS Clarifies Scope of Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative
Deadline Extension, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 31, 2011, at 169-18 (providing exam-
ples of this situation and guidance with respect to the 2011 Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Initiative).
6. JodiJ. Schwartz, NYSBA Tax Section Comments on FAQfor 2011 Offshore Volun-
tary Disclosure Initiative, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 9, 2011, at 153-13 (footnotes
omitted).
7. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND
GOV'T AFFAIRs, 109TH CONG., TAx HAVEN ABUSES: THE ENABLERS, THE TooLs AND
SECRECY 5 (2006), available at http://levin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/support-
ing/2006/PSI.taxhavenabuses.080106.pdf.
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tax laws.8 Among those efforts are special "voluntary disclosure" initiatives
run by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), one of which ended in Septem-
ber 2011,9 and another of which began in January 2012.10
Under a voluntary disclosure program, eligible taxpayers report their
delinquent taxes in return for reduced penalties, a reduced likelihood of
criminal prosecution upon detection of the evasion, or both.1 It is thus a
form of "tax amnesty."1 2 The 2012 offshore voluntary disclosure initiative
is the third such program within the past few years.13
It is difficult to measure the success of a voluntary disclosure initiative
because, in the year of its implementation, a voluntary disclosure program,
like any tax amnesty, is a boon to the federal fisc. But government actions
also create incentives. The tax amnesty literature recognizes the risk that
amnesties, especially repeated ones, will encourage taxpayers to believe
that they can evade taxes currently, then come in later and pay a dis-
8. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS FAcr SHEET FS-2012-6, IRS RELEASES 2006
TAx GAP EsTHWATEs (2012) [hereinafter FS-2012-6], available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-news/fs-12-06.pdf (stating that "[s]topping offshore tax cheating and
getting these people, especially high net-worth individuals, back into the tax system
has been a top priority of the IRS" and listing as initiatives voluntary disclosure
programs IRS conducted in 2009 and 2011, enforcement actions against foreign
banks, and Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), Pub. L. No. 111-147,§§ 501-41, 124 Stat. 71, 97-117 (2010)).
9. See FS-2012-6, supra note 8. Originally, the deadline was August 31, 2011.
See I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-14 (Feb. 8, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-news/ir-11-014.pdf. However, it was extended to September 9, 2011 due
to Hurricane Irene. OVDI Deadline Extended Due to Hurricane Irene, TAX NOTES To-
DAY, Aug. 26, 2011, at 16745.
10. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2012-5 (Jan. 9, 2012), available at http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-12-005.pdf.
11. For example, the 2011 voluntary disclosure initiative states, "Taxpayers
hiding assets offshore who do not come forward will face far higher penalty scena-
rios as well as the possibility of criminal prosecution." IR-2011-14, supra note 9.
12. See Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility
of Amnesty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 667, 694 (2007) ("[A] typical tax amnesty offers
tax evaders a window of opportunity within which to voluntary disclose their eva-
sion in exchange for the reduction or elimination of penalties-either monetary
or criminal.").
13. See IR-2012-5, supra note 10 ("The IRS reopened the Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Program (OVDP) following continued strong interest from taxpayers
and tax practitioners after the closure of the 2011 and 2009 programs. The third
offshore program comes as the IRS continues working on a wide range of interna-
tional tax issues and follows ongoing efforts with the Justice Department to pursue
criminal prosecution of international tax evasion."). Counting the 2003 voluntary
disclosure initiative that grew out of the offshore credit card project would make
the 2012 program the fourth in the last decade. For discussion of the 2003 initia-
tive, see infra notes 30-44, and accompanying text.
2012] 501
VILLANOVA IAW RmVIEw
counted rate 14-unless the amnesty is coupled with increased
enforcement. 15
This Article examines the advisability of continued use of voluntary
disclosure initiatives as a tool in the fight against international tax non-
compliance. Part II of the Article briefly discusses the history of IRS volun-
tary disclosure programs, focusing particularly on the offshore initiatives
of 2003, 2009, 2011, and 2012. In Part III, the Article evaluates the govern-
ment's approach to voluntary disclosure of offshore evasion in light of the
literature on optimal tax amnesties, finding that the offshore tax amnes-
ties meet some but not all of the elements of an optimal amnesty. The
Article concludes that the crackdown on offshore evasion has encouraged
quite a number of taxpayers to make voluntary disclosures, but that the
IRS's repeated use of offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives may have di-
minishing returns unless the government continues to engage in well-pub-
licized criminal prosecutions of tax evaders.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
A. Voluntary Disclosure Generally
The IRS has a long history of encouraging voluntary disclosures of tax
evasion. In 1919, the IRS had a policy not to criminally prosecute taxpay-
ers making a voluntary disclosure. 1 6 Although the policy was quickly
amended to remove the commitment to forgo criminal prosecution, the
IRS reinstituted that policy from 1945 to 1952.' The IRS abandoned the
policy again in 1952 partly because it allowed taxpayers to claim immunity
from prosecution regardless of the context of their voluntary disclosure.1 8
Once the non-prosecution policy was withdrawn in January 1952, the
IRS's official position was that voluntary disclosure was merely a factor to
be considered in whether to recommend a taxpayer for criminal prosecu-
tion.19 In 1962, the advent of automatic processing of tax returns raised
14. See Herman B. Leonard & RichardJ. Zeckhauser, Amnesty, Enforcement, and
Tax Policy, 1 TAx POL'Y & EcoN. 55, 55 (1987) ("Current amnesties may have en-
couraged some citizens to believe that there will be future amnesties as well, reduc-
ing their incentives to keep current on their payments.").
15. See id. at 65 ("A tax amnesty is almost inevitably coupled with increased
penalties and enforcement efforts. . . . If strong sanctions are prerequisites for
maintenance of guilt and conscience ... then a tax amnesty could actually be part
of a guilt-strengthening effort.").
16. See Bartholomew L. McLeay, Note, Disincentives to Voluntary Disclosure
United States v. Hebel and Deleet Merchandizing Corp. v. Commissioner, 3 VA.
TAx REv. 401, 403 (1984) (citing IRS REPORT ON ROLE OF SANCTIONS IN TAx COM-
PLIANCE, HISTORY OF VOLUNTARY DIscLOsuRE POLIcY (Sept. 1968)).
17. See id. at 403-04 (reviewing history of voluntary disclosure policy).
18. See Gerald P. Moran, Tax Amnesty: An Old Debate as Viewed from Current
Public Choices, 1 FLA. TAx REv. 307, 317 (1992) ("There was also some concern
about possible corruption by government officials arising from the discretion in-
herent in the original policy.").
19. See McLeay, supra note 16, at 406 (citing I.R.S. News Release I.R. 61-432
(Dec. 13, 1961)); see also Moran, supra note 18, at 316-17 (discussing history of
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concerns on the part of some nonfilers that they would-be detected.2 0 At
that time, Commissioner Mortimer Caplin issued a news release stating,
"[T]he question may arise whether a taxpayer's voluntary disclosure of his
willful violations will afford immunity against criminal prosecution. I want
to reaffirm our existing policy in this regard. Even true voluntary disclo-
sure of a willful violation will not of itself guarantee prosecution immu-
nity."2 1 Nonetheless, one commentator reports that "[dlespite the
admonition that a voluntary disclosure did not immunize a taxpayer from
criminal liability, an internal [IRS] memorandum disclosed that, at least
from 1969 until 1974, the position of the Chief Counsel's Office was that a
timely, good faith disclosure was 'dispositive' of the prosecution issue."22
In 1974, the IRS adopted a policy of considering the factors that triggered
the taxpayer's disclosure.2 3
Currently, the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) provides general vol-
untary disclosure provisions under the section titled Criminal Investiga-
tions-Other Investigations.24 The IRM provides that "a voluntary
disclosure will be considered along with all other factors in the investiga-
tion in determining whether criminal prosecution will be recom-
mended."25 It further states that:
A voluntary disclosure occurs when the communication is truth-
ful, timely, complete, and when:
a. A taxpayer shows a willingness to cooperate (and does in
fact cooperate) with the IRS in determining his/her cor-
rect tax liability, and
b. The taxpayer makes good faith arrangements with the
IRS to pay in full, the tax, interest, and any penalties de-
termined by the IRS to be applicable.2 6
It goes on to define what constitutes a timely disclosure.27 In general, in
order to be "timely," a voluntary disclosure must occur before the tax-
payer's noncompliance is on the IRS's radar.28
I.R.S. policy regarding waiving criminal prosecution in connection with a voluntary
disclosure).
20. See Harry Graham Balter, Caplin Restates Voluntary Disclosure Policy as Ru-
mors of IRS Change Circulate, 16 J. TAX'N 104, 104 (1962).
21. Id. at 104.
22. McLeay, supra note 16, at 406.
23. See id. at 406-07.
24. See IRM 9.5.11.9 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/.
25. Id. § 1. The IRM further provides, "A voluntary disclosure will not auto-
matically guarantee immunity from prosecution; however, a voluntary disclosure
may result in prosecution not being recommended. This practice does not apply
to taxpayers with illegal source income." Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
26. Id. § 3 (emphasis added).
27. See id. § 4.
28. More precisely, the IRM provides:
A disclosure is timely if it is received before:
2012]1 503
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In addition to this general voluntary disclosure regime, the IRS also
periodically offers targeted voluntary compliance initiatives. For example,
it offered one in 1992 for nonfilers.2 9 With respect to offshore tax eva-
sion, the IRS has offered a series of programs in the last decade. Each of
these was connected with publicity about a crackdown on offshore evasion.
B. Voluntary Disclosure of Offshore Tax Evasion
The first of the offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives was in 2003.
That initiative was related to an offshore credit card project the IRS pur-
sued starting in 2000.30 That project involved serving "John Doe" sum-
monses on major credit card companies, such as MasterCard and
American Express, seeking records on foreign bank accounts. 3 1 For
example:
On October 30, 2000, a U.S. District Court in Miami, Florida,
authorized the IRS to issue John Doe summonses to MasterCard
International and American Express. These summonses relate to
accounts in Antigua, Barbuda, the Bahamas, and the Cayman Is-
lands issued to U.S. customers for tax years 1998 and 1999.
These John Doe summonses were designed to allow the IRS to
secure information from a reasonably identifiable group-U.S.-
based customers with credit card accounts in certain foreign
countries-who may be using offshore bank accounts to evade
U.S. taxes.32
A. The IRS has initiated a civil examination or criminal investigation
of the taxpayer, or has notified the taxpayer that it intends to com-
mence such an examination or investigation.
B. The IRS has received information from a third party (e.g., in-
formant, other governmental agency, or the media) alerting the IRS
to the specific taxpayer's noncompliance.
C. The IRS has initiated a civil examination or criminal investigation
which is directly related to the specific liability of the taxpayer.
D. The IRS has acquired information directly related to the specific
liability of the taxpayer from a criminal enforcement action (e.g.,
search warrant, grand jury subpoena).
Id.
29. See Moran, supra note 18, at 318 ("On September 30, 1992, the Internal
Revenue Service issued a notice announcing the adoption of a special program to
provide comprehensive support for the ten million nonfilers.").
30. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 2003-30-160, THE OFF-
SHORE CREDIT CARD PROJEcr SHOWS PROMISE, BUT IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO
ENSURE THAT COMPLIANCE OBJECTIVES ARE ACHIEVED (2003) [hereinafter 2003-30-
160], available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2003reports/200330
160fr.html.
31. See id.; see also Paul Jensen & Pam Spikes, Offshore Credit Card Records: Inva-
sion By the IRS, 29 INT'L TAxJ. 59, 59 (2003). AJohn Doe summons does not name
the taxpayer whose liability is in issue. See I.R.C. § 7609(f) (2006).
32. Josh 0. Ungerman, Voluntary Disclosure and IRS Attacks on Offshore Credit
Cards, 4 CORP. Bus. TAX'N MONTHLY 3, 3 (2003) (footnote omitted).
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In 2002, the IRS served additional summonses on MasterCard Interna-
tional and Visa International.3 3
The summonses produced a substantial amount of data,34 but the
data was not very complete. "The cardholder records obtained from the
credit card companies did not include cardholder identifiers such as name
or Social Security Number. In addition to the cardholder records from
the John Doe summonses . . . the IRS issued merchant summonses for
charge card transactions, which helped identify specific taxpayers."3 5 Af-
ter collecting the information from the John Doe summonses, the IRS re-
vised downward its estimate of how many credit card holders were
involved.8 6
Professor Keith Fogg explains that taking enforcement action based
on the information obtained from the John Doe Summonses proved insti-
tutionally difficult for the IRS. For one thing, the "influx of data created a
situation in which the IRS could not realistically pursue all of the individu-
als suspected of offshore credit card ownership."37 For another,
By the time the IRS gathered enough data to place cases in the
hands of revenue agents, the cases were much older than "nor-
mal" cases placed into the audit stream. This meant that agents
were receiving cases that would almost certainly have the three-
year statute of limitations on assessment expire before the agents
could complete their audits. Revenue agents receive much train-
ing and instruction on the importance of not allowing a statute
of limitations to expire. Receipt of cases that almost by definition
required them to complete a blown statute report did not sit well
with the agents as a group or their managers.3 8
Around the time of the service of the John Doe summonses,3 9 " [i]n
February 2003, the IRS announced its 'Offshore Voluntary Compliance
33. Id.
34. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS FAcT SHEET FS-2002-12, IRS SETS NEW
AUDIT PRIORITIEs (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-02-
12.pdf ("The first summons alone yielded data from MasterCard on 237,000 cards
issued through 28 banks in three countries.").
35. 2003-30-160, supra note 30 (footnote omitted).
36. I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-5 (Jan. 14, 2003), available at www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-news/ir-03-05.pdf [hereinafter IR-2003-5] (explaining that IRS found "du-
plicate cards issued to the same individual, inactive or small-dollar accounts, peo-
ple using the cards because of bad credit, persons traveling abroad and a wide
range of other non-tax reasons for holding the cards").
37. Keith Fogg, Go West: How The IRS Should Foster Innovation in Its Agents, 57
VILL. L. REv. 441, 463 (2012).
38. Id. at 462. He added, "[R]evenue agents with these cases generally
needed . .. to mak [e] a fraud case ... in order to keep the statute of limitations on
assessment open." Id. The government bears the burden of proving fraud. See
I.R.C. § 7454(a) (2006).
39. See Fogg, supra note 37, at 464 ("The initial wave of credit card sum-
monses occurred from October 2000 through December 2003.").
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Initiative,' [(OVCI)] a program designed to allow taxpayers to step for-
ward and 'clear up their tax liabilities.' 40 It provided that the IRS would,
"in appropriate circumstances, impose the delinquency penalty under sec-
tion 6651, the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662, or both penal-
ties against taxpayers that participate in the Offshore Voluntary
Compliance Initiative." 4  The program waived the fraud penalty, the
fraudulent failure-to-file penalty, and certain information return penalties
otherwise applicable to participating taxpayers. 4 2 In addition, participat-
ing taxpayers would not be criminally prosecuted.4 3
The IRS directly linked the offshore credit card project and the volun-
tary disclosure initiative:
OVCI is just one part of an on-going, multi-pronged effort by
the IRS to counter offshore tax evasion.
A related, but separate component of the effort is the Off-
shore Credit Card Program (OCCP). This program stems from
the John Doe summons investigation. Since October 2000, the
IRS has issued a series of summonses to a variety of financial and
commercial businesses to obtain information on residents who
held credit, debit or other payment cards issued by offshore
banks.
Investigators have been using records from the John Doe
summonses to trace the identities of people whose use of these
payment cards may be related to hiding taxable income.
In the weeks and months ahead, the IRS will continue work-
ing on the OVCI and OCCP programs. As part of this process,
the IRS will continue its work to identify and pursue civil and/or
criminal penalties against those engaged in improper offshore
transactions.4 4
The 2003 voluntary disclosure initiative had an April 15 deadline,4 5
but, in June 2003, the IRS sent over 600 "last chance" letters to taxpayers it
had identified as having offshore credit cards, offering them an opportu-
40. Ungerman, supra note 32, at 4 (quoting IR-2003-5, supra note 36).
41. Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-1 C.B. 311 § 2.01(2), available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-03-1 1.pdf.
42. See id. § 2(1) ("[T]he Service ... will not impose the civil fraud penalty
under section 6663, the fraudulent failure to file penalty under section 6651(f),
and information return civil penalties for failure to comply with sections 6035,
6038, 6038A, 6038B, 6038C, 6039F, 6046, 6046A, and 6048"); see also IR-2003-5,
supra note 36.
43. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-95 (July 30, 2003) [hereinafter IR-2003-
95], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-03-95.pdf; see also IR-2003-5,
supra note 36.
44. IR-2003-95, supra note 43.
45. See Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-1 C.B. 311 § 3.01, available at http://www.irs.
gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-03-1 1.pdf.
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nity to participate in the program. 46 The 2003 initiative had some modest
success, but less than the IRS initially thought. In July 2003, the IRS
reported:
[C]urrent results show the initiative's effectiveness:
* Taxpayers have already paid more than $75 million in
taxes to the program.
* The $75 million figure will continue to grow because most
taxpayers accepted into the program have until Oct. 15 to
amend their tax returns and pay back taxes.
* OVCI applicants identified more than 400 offshore pro-
moters. Of these, 214 promoters were previously unknown
to the IRS, which helps the agency's efforts to counter off-
shore tax evasion.
* While the program has led to $75 million in taxes col-
lected, the cost of the OVCI program is approximately $2
million to date.4 7
Subsequently, however, an investigation by the Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) undermined those results:
The IRS initially believed that upwards of $100 million in identi-
fied unpaid taxes were available for assessment. As ofJune 30,
2003, the IRS assessed only $3.3 million with only $744,546 hav-
ing been collected. According to TIGTA, the largest assessment
was for $375,000. . . . TIGTA also reported that the cost of the
OVCI project has been estimated at $56 million.4 8
The credit card initiative had limited success largely because the IRS
was not prepared to audit all of the individuals it identified who did not
participate in the voluntary disclosure initiative.49 However, the IRS did
46. See Government Accountability Office, GAO Audits IRS FY 2003 and 2004
Financial Statements, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 17, 2003, at 221-58; Martin A. Sullivan,
Economic Analysis: Keeping Score on Offshore: UK. 60,000, U.S. 1,300, 116 TAX NOTES
23, 26 (2007).
47. IR-2003-95, supra note 43.
48. Charles E. Grassley & Max Baucus, Finance Leaders Request "Prompt" Review
of Offshore Compliance Initiative, TAX NOTES TODAY, July 29, 2003, at 146-22.
49. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, JCT Describes Compliance Issues Affecting Off-
shore Accounts, TAX NOTEs TODAY, Apr. 1, 2009, at 60-15 ("Then IRS Commissioner
Mark Everson discussed the limited success of the OVCI initiative at a ... hearing
on August 1, 2006. Within his testimony, he stated 'In reality, we did not have a
good idea of the potential universe of individuals covered by this initiative. As a
result, the incentive for taxpayers to come forward and take advantage of this initi-
ative was diminished due to the fact that we did not have the ability to identify
immediately and begin examinations for all non-participating individuals.'" (quot-
ing Written Testimony of Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson Before
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs' Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations Hearing on Offshore Abuses: The Enablers, The
Tools and Offshore Secrecy, 109th Cong., August 1, 2006)).
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identify over 400 promoters of abusive offshore financial arrangements.5 0
It also referred a few dozen cases to the Criminal Investigation Division for
prosecution prior to the voluntary disclosure deadline. 5 '
A number of years went by before the IRS's next voluntary disclosure
initiative, which took place in 2009. That initiative was also in conjunction
with a crackdown on offshore evasion. The crackdown focused on Swiss
bank accounts, particularly those held at Union Bank of Switzerland
(UBS):
Strained relations between Switzerland, a country with a long tra-
dition of bank secrecy, and the United States began during the
summer of 2008 when a disgruntled former UBS employee, code
name Tarantula revealed that "he was part of a UBS team that
made frequent trips across the Atlantic [to the United States] to
aggressively market investment strategies to rich Americans" to
evade the IRS.52
"Tarantula" was Bradley Birkenfeld, a UBS "private banker."5 3
Birkenfeld's job had been to prospect for American clients.5 4 The Justice
Department indicted him in 2008,15 and he pled guilty to helping an
American billionaire evade federal income taxes.56
Birkenfeld's arrest prompted the Justice Department to investigate
UBS.5 1 In June 2008, the Justice Department:
[F]iled a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida requesting leave to file an IRS administrative sum-
mons with UBS asking the bank to disclose the names of all of its
U.S. clients who have opened accounts in Switzerland, but for
which the bank has not filed forms with the IRS disclosing the
Swiss accounts. The court approved service of the summons on
50. See id.
51. See INrERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS Release on Offshore Credit Cards, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Mar. 13, 2003, at 50-8.
52. Jared Seff, Cracking Down on Tax Evaders-Swiss Banking: Secrets, Lies, and
Deception, 38 S.U. L. REv. 159, 160 (2010) (alteration in original) (citing Graham
Bowley, A Privileged World Begins to Give up Its Secrets, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 2009, at
WK3).
53. See id. Birkenfeld was Tax Analysts' 2009 Person of the Year. See Year in
Review: The 2009 Person of the Year, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 4, 2010, at 1-3.
54. See Evan Thomas & Mark Hosenball, Cracking the Vault, NEWSWEEK, Mar.
13, 2009, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13/
cracking-the-vault.html.
55. See Stewart, supra note 5. Birkenfeld was arrested in May 2008 when he
returned to the U.S. from Switzerland to attend his 25th high school reunion. See
Year in Review: The 2009 Person of the Year, supra note 53 (also noting that
"Birkenfeld did not obtain immunity from prosecution in exchange for his disclo-
sures" about UBS's actions).
56. See Lynnley Browning, Ex-UBS Banker Pleads Guilty in Tax Evasion, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 20, 2008, at Cl.
57. Seff, supra note 52, at 162.
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UBS on July 1, 2008.... This John Doe summons represents the
first time that the United States has attempted to pierce Swiss
bank secrecy by compelling a Swiss bank to name its U.S.
clients.58
In 2009, the U.S. government charged UBS with conspiring to de-
fraud the United States by assisting accountholders in evading the IRS.'
In February 2009, UBS signed a deferred prosecution agreement.
"[U]nder the terms of the agreement, UBS will provide the U.S. govern-
ment with the names of 200 to 300 U.S. clients of UBS's cross-border busi-
ness, exit the business of providing banking services to U.S. clients with
undeclared accounts, and pay a total of $780 million in fines and
penalties."6 0
At that time, UBS had not yet responded to the John Doe summons,
so the U.S. government filed a petition in district court to enforce the
summons. 6 1 UBS objected, citing Swiss bank secrecy law among its rea-
sons.62 The Swiss government stepped in, filing an amicus brief arguing
that the United States could only obtain accountholder information via a
request under the 1996 U.S.-Swiss tax treaty.6 3 In August 2009, the United
States and Switzerland reached an agreement to treat the request as occur-
ring under the treaty, as well as to sign a protocol amending the treaty and
to have the U.S. government withdraw the John Doe summons.6 4 Under
the agreement, the U.S. government received the names of 4,450 U.S.
UBS account holders. 65
58. STAFF OF PERMANENT S. COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC'Y AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., STAFF REP., TAx HAVEN BANKS
AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 3 (2008), available at http://www.levin.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/supporting/2008/071708PSIReport.pdf (footnotes omitted).
59. DOJ Announces Deferred Prosecution Agreement with UBS, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Feb. 19, 2009, at 31-32.
60. Laura Szarmach, Note, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United
States' Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 409, 411 (2010).
61. See id.
62. See id. Swiss bank secrecy focuses on protecting the financial information
of accountholders. See Urs Martin Lauchli, Swiss Bank Secrecy with Comparative As-
pects to the American Approach, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 865, 865 (1998) ("The Swiss
approach to bank secrecy, simply stated, protects the right of bank customers to
have their financial information remain confidential and enforces the banker's
duty to safeguard that right. If bankers fail in this duty, they are subject to criminal
sanctions.").
63. See Szarmach, supra note 60, at 411.
64. See Agreement on the Request for Information from the Internal Revenue
Service of the United States of America Regarding UBS AG, a Corporation Estab-
lished Under the Laws of the Swiss Confederation, U.S.-Switz., art. 1-3, Aug. 19,
2009, available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/documents/us-swiss-agreement.pdf;
see also Szarmach, supra note 60, at 411.
65. Wallace, supra note 5. Tax attorney Charles Rettig explained:
The criteria included the disclosure of accounts at UBS between
2001 and 2008 with a balance of more than 1 million Swiss francs, to-
gether with various types of custody accounts (including bank-only ac-
2012] 509
VILLANovA LAw REVIEw
Right around this time, in March 2009, the IRS announced the 2009
voluntary disclosure initiative for offshore tax evasion.16 Under the initia-
tive, participating taxpayers were required to pay taxes and interest due on
amounts in the account for the previous six years; either an accuracy-re-
lated penalty or a delinquency penalty on each of those six years; and a
penalty of 20% on the highest account or asset value in that six-year pe-
riod. 67 The program also required participants to disclose information
about their foreign accounts, including the names of the financial institu-
tions they used and the names of their contacts at those institutions.68
The 2009 initiative was timed to profit from the publicity about
Birkenfeld and UBS: "Following the announcement in May 2008 that the
Justice Department had indicted former UBS banker Bradley Birkenfeld,
the IRS voluntary disclosure program saw a dramatic rise in taxpayers com-
ing forward to turn over information on previously undisclosed Swiss bank
accounts."69 The 2009 initiative brought in about 15,000 disclosures-
many times more than the approximately 1,000 that the IRS reportedly
expected.7 0 In early 2012, the IRS reported that it had "collected $3.4
billion so far from people who participated in the 2009 offshore program,
reflecting closures of about 95 percent of the cases from the 2009
program."7 1
counts) in which securities or other investment assets were held, and
offshore company nominee accounts through which individuals indi-
rectly held beneficial ownership.The disclosure criteria also included (i)
250 accounts in which there is evidence of "fraudulent conduct," such as
false documents or the use of calling cards to disguise the source of trad-
ing (the threshold for disclosure is 250,000 francs), and (ii) 4,200 ac-
counts that generated revenues of an average of more than 100,000
francs a year for at least three years, including any year between 2001-
2008.
Charles P. Rettig, Evaluation of an IRS Undisclosed Offshore Account IDR TAx NOTES
TODAY, Sept. 30, 2011, at 217-12.
66. See Kristen A. Parillo & Jeremiah Coder, IRS Reduces Penalties on Voluntarily
Disclosed Offshore Accounts, TAx NOTES TODAY, Mar. 27, 2009, at 57-2.
67. See id.; see also Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Issues Memorandum Outlining
Penalty Structure for Voluntary Disclosure, TAx NOTES TODAY, Mar. 27, 2009, at 57-34
[hereinafter IRS Issues Memorandum]; Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Releases FAQ on
Voluntary Disclosure Program for Offshore Accounts, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 7, 2009, at
86-14 [hereinafter IRS Releases 2009 FAQ] ("The twenty percent penalty applies to
all assets (or at least the taxpayer's share) held by foreign entities (e.g., trusts and
corporations) for which the taxpayer was required to file information returns, as
well as all foreign assets (e.g., financial accounts, tangible assets such as real estate
or art, and intangible assets such as patents or stock or other interests in a U.S.
business) held or controlled by the taxpayer.").
68. See Rettig, supra note 65.
69. Stewart, supra note 5.
70. Shulman Addresses IRS's Strategic Piorities for the Future, TAX NOTES TODAY,
May 19, 2011, at 97-11 (releasing prepared remarks of I.R.S. Commissioner Doug-
las Shulman) [hereinafter Strategic Priorities].
71. IR-2012-5, supra note 10.
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After 2009, the government continued to focus on pursuing offshore
tax evasion. The IRS mined the data it received from the 2009 initiative.72
The government continued to prosecute UBS clients.7 3 In early 2012, it
also indicted three private bankers from the Swiss bank Wegelin & Co.7 4
and a number of Credit Suisse bankers in the United States.75 The gov-
ernment also requested from other Swiss banks, including Credit Suisse,
the names of U.S. account holders.7 6
In another widely publicized move, HSBC [a London-based
banking and financial services organization] ended its foreign
banking services for its wealthiest U.S.-resident customers.
United States residents will now be served only by the bank's
wealth management division through its U.S. branch. The news
came shortly after the DOJ announced an indictment implicating
HSBC India.77
The U.S. government has also received information about offshore
evasion from whistleblowers.78 Bradley Birkenfeld, who applied for
72. See Rettig, supra note 65.
73. See Offshore Tax-Avoidance and IRS Compliance Efforts, I.R.S., http://www.irs.
gov/uac/Offshore-Tax-Avoidance-and-IRS-Compliance-Efforts (last reviewed or
updated Aug. 1, 2012) (listing UBS clients who were prosecuted and legal actions
to date).
74. See David D. Stewart, 3 Swiss Bankers Indicted for Hiding $ 1.2 Billion, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Jan. 5, 2012, at 3-2 ("In its case before the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York, the Justice Department alleged that Michael
Berlinka, Urs Frei, and Roger Keller helped conceal more than $1.2 billion in
assets for U.S. clients. The government claims that the defendants used a website
to solicit U.S. clients and sought to attract UBS customers whose accounts were
scheduled to be closed after that bank announced that it was closing its U.S.-held
offshore accounts as it faced investigations in the United States.").
75. See Marie Sapirie, Practitioners Assess Offshore Initiative as Deadline Ap-
proaches, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 15, 2011, at 157-1.
76. See id. After this request, Credit Suisse started informing "its U.S. private
banking clients that their information is subject to disclosure under a treaty re-
quest made by the U.S. authorities." See David D. Stewart, Credit Suisse Preparing to
Report Client Data to U.S., TAx NoTEs TODAY, Nov. 9, 2011, at 217-8. However, the
Swiss Federal Administrative Court in Bern recently upheld an accountholder's
appeal, relying on the distinction under Swiss law between tax fraud, for which
information exchange exists under the 1996 U.S.-Swiss treaty, and tax evasion, for
which it does not. See David Jolly, Swiss Court Ruling Hampers a Tax Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2012, at B5.
77. Sapirie, supra note 75.
78. See Marie Sapirie, New Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Features 25 Per-
cent Penalty, Greater Clarity, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 9, 2011, at 27-1.
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whistleblower status,79 was successfully prosecuted.8 0 However, practition-
ers have said that Birkenfeld's prosecution had only "a 'slight chilling ef-
fect' on other would-be informants."81
In 2010, as another line of attack on offshore tax evasion, the federal
government enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),
as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act.82 In
part, FATCA requires taxpayers to disclose foreign financial assets aggre-
gating in excess of a financial threshold.83 The disclosure must be made
in a statement attached to the taxpayer's return; the IRS released Form
8938 for this purpose.84 This requirement may overlap with the FBAR,
but it has a higher reporting threshold and includes non-cash assets.8 5
FATCA also imposes obligations on foreign banks, requiring them to
withhold 30% on United States-sourced payments to foreign financial in-
stitutions unless the bank enters into an information-disclosure agreement
with the Secretary of the Treasury.86
Because the choice to withhold rather than report is an institu-
tion-wide one, foreign banks with clients from different countries
have an incentive to comply with FATCA, especially if some of
79. See David D. Stewart, Attorney in UBS Scandal Sees Reward Claim as Test of
U.S. Whistle-blower Policy, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Dec. 7, 2009, at 232-4 ("Dean Zerbe,
national managing director for Alliantgroup and special counsel to the National
Whistleblowers Center, discussed Birkenfeld's claim in a December 3 interview.
Zerbe explained that Birkenfeld filed a whistle-blower claim early on in the process
of his cooperation with the IRS. He said that his role is to 'perfect' Birkenfeld's
claim.").
80. National Whistleblowers Center Takes Issue with DOJ Prosecution of UBS
Whistleblower, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 8, 2010, at 67-30 ("The DOJ not only did not
credit Mr. Birkenfeld with disclosure of the scandal, it actively prosecuted him. In
other words, the bad guy was let go and the good guy is in jail." (quoting statement
by NWC Executive Director Stephen M. Kohn)).
81. Marie Sapirie, New Era of International Enforcement Follows UBS, TAX NoTEs
TODAY, Aug. 10, 2011, at 154-2 (quoting Scott D. Michel of Caplin & Drysdale).
82. See Christopher M. Reimer, The Undiscovered Country: Wyoming's Emergence
as a Leading Trust Situs Jurisdiction, 11 Wyo. L. REv. 165, 169 (2011); see also Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501-41, 124 Stat.
71, 97-117 (2010).
83. See I.R.C. § 6038D (West 2010) (providing for threshold of $50,000, or
higher amount determined by the Treasury Department); Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6038D-2T(a) (2011) (providing thresholds ranging from $50,000 to $600,000,
depending on marital status and whether taxpayer lives in United States or
abroad).The reporting requirement "is effective for tax years starting after March
18, 2010, which for most people will be their 2011 tax returns filed during the 2012
filing season." IRS Releases Information Detailing Regs, Filing Requirements for Reporting
Foreign Financial Assets, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Dec. 16, 2011, at 242-25.
84. See I.R.S. Form 8938 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f8938.pdf.
85. See Marie Sapirie, Foreign Financial Asset Reporting Regs Broad in Scope, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Dec. 16, 2011, at 242-2.
86. See Niels Jense, Note, How to Kill the Scapegoat: Addressing Offshore Tax Eva-
sion with a Special View to Switzerland, 63 VAND. L. REv. 1823, 1849-50 (2010).
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their non-U.S. clients would be taxed at less than thirty percent
on their investment income or are evading their home country's
taxes completely. By choosing not to disclose under FATCA, a
foreign financial institution in essence subjects all of its custom-
ers to a thirty percent tax on U.S. income. Since such a uniform
tax may scare away clients, foreign banks have a strong incentive
to comply. Although U.S. clients will lose their privacy protec-
tion, the institution's other clients will remain unaffected by the
institution's compliance-they can continue to enjoy favorable
tax treatment by the United States, while possibly avoiding their
home countries' taxes.8 7
The effective date of this part of FATCA was recently extended, so that
withholding obligations will begin in 2014.88
Professor Morse explains that the withholding requirement may not
really be enforceable.89 Nonetheless, and although it has not yet taken
effect, this portion of FATCA has already had an impact:
The reporting and withholding requirements of the Foreign Ac-
count Tax Compliance Act have stung some U.S. taxpayers who
live abroad: They have found themselves being unceremoniously
dumped by their local banks in anticipation of what Scott D.
Michel, a partner at Caplin & Drysdale, referred to as the coming
"era of automatic disclosure."90
Despite the highly publicized crackdown on offshore evasion in 2009,
some eligible taxpayers did not take advantage of the 2009 voluntary dis-
87. Id. at 1850.
88. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-53, 2011-32 I.R.B. 124 ("[Planned] regulations will
provide that certain obligations of participating FFIs (Foreign Financial Institu-
tions] will commence in 2013. Further, those regulations will provide that the
section 1471 (a) and section 1472 (a) withholding obligations of withholding agents
with respect to amounts described in section 1473(1) (A) (i) (U.S. source FDAP
payments) will begin onJanuary 1, 2014.").
89. Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global Tax Reporting,
57 VILL. L. REv. 529, 537 (2012) (explaining that "imposing a withholding tax
could ... require the commitment of international relations resources" and "pro-
duce unwanted capital market disruptions" and that "the United States lacks the
jurisdiction to confirm directly that FFIs are in fact complying with their obliga-
tions under their agreements"). She suggests ways in which the United States gov-
ernment might maximize its enforcement of FATCA. See id. at 542-49.
90. Sapirie, supra note 75. Professor Morse explains:
[N]on-U.S. FFIs might embrace compliance with FATCA as a positive
reputational signal to clients and governments. This signal might grow in
strength as more banks comply with the FATCA and as compliant banks
increasingly commit to FATCA compliance through their very acts of due
diligence and reporting. There are certain choices that U.S. policymak-
ers can make to maximize the chance that FATCA will succeed as a
reputational strategy. . . . But the success of this approach is far from
certain.
Morse, supra note 89, at 537-38.
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closure initiative. Some made voluntary disclosures under the general pol-
icy.91 Other taxpayers came in "quietly"-simply amending old returns
and paying back taxes and interest,9 2 an approach the government
discouraged.9 3
Given the continuing volume of taxpayers coming in to disclose non-
compliance regarding offshore accounts after the close of the 2009 initia-
tive,9 4 the government perceived a need for another voluntary disclosure
program.9 5 Accordingly, on February 8, 2011, the IRS announced the
91. See IRS Releases FAQ on Second Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Feb. 9, 2011, at 27-19 [hereinafter IRS Releases 2011 FAQ ("Is a
taxpayer who previously sought relief under the IRS's traditional Voluntary Disclo-
sure Practice or who made a quiet disclosure before the 2011 OVDI was an-
nounced eligible for the terms of the 2011 OVDI?").
92. See IRS Releases 2009 FAQ, supra note 67 ("The IRS is aware that some
taxpayers have attempted so-called 'quiet' disclosures by filing amended returns
and paying any related tax and interest for previously unreported offshore income
without otherwise notifying the IRS.").
93. SeeJeremiah Coder, U.S. Gaining on Offshore Accounts, IRS Officials Say, TAX
NOTES TODAY, Nov. 17, 2009, at 219-7 ("Arlette Lee, a special agent in the IRS
Criminal Investigation division . ... [Wiarned that trying to make a quiet disclo-
sure to avoid directly putting the government on notice of unreported offshore
accounts could result in charges of tax evasion and filing a false tax return. 'We
want people to come through the program; if you don't and take another route,
this is what you potentially could be facing if we find out about you,' she said.");
Bank Director Charged with Hiding Foreign Assets, Used Offshore Account to Conceal In-
come from IRS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE (May 19, 2011), http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/
2011/May/11-tax-642.html ("On its website, the IRS strongly encourages taxpayers
to come forward under the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program and warns
them that taxpayers who instead make silent disclosures risk being criminally pros-
ecuted for all applicable years.").At least one taxpayer who made a quiet disclosure
was prosecuted. See id. ("According to the criminal information and plea agree-
ment, on Oct. 6, 2009, following widespread media coverage of UBS's disclosure to
the IRS of account records for undeclared accounts held by U.S. taxpayers and the
IRS's Voluntary Disclosure Program, [Michael] Schiavo made a 'silent disclosure'
by preparing and filing FBARs and amended Forms 1040 for tax years 2003 to
2008, in which he reported the existence of his previously undeclared account at
HSBC Bank Bermuda."). However, according to the indictment, Mr. Schiavo did
not amend his 2006 return to report a taxable payment he had received until after
an IRS special agent contacted him. See Bank Director Charged with Failure to Report
Interest in Foreign Bank Account TAX NOTES TODAY, May 23, 2011, at 99-21 (discuss-
ing United States v. Schiavo, No. 11-10984 (D. Mass. 2011)).
94. See Strategic Priorities, supra note 70 ("[Slince [the 2009 initiative] closed,
we've received an additional 4,000 voluntary disclosures from individuals with se-
cret bank accounts from around the world."); Paul Sullivan, Voluntarily Disclose Your
Offshore Accounts, or Else, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 2011, at B5 ("[A]fter [the 2009 pro-
gram] officially ended, thousands more came forward, flooding the I.R.S. enforce-
ment system.").
95. See Sullivan, supra note 94 ("[It made sense from an I.R.S. perspective to
offer a second round of disclosure. . . ." given the continuing volume of disclosures
after the 2009 program closed); see also IRS Clanfies Scope of Offshore Voluntary Disclo-
sure Initiative Deadline Extension, supra note 5 ("The IRS's prior Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Program . . ., which closed on October 15, 2009, demonstrated the
value of a uniform penalty structure for taxpayers who came forward voluntarily
and reported their previously undisclosed foreign accounts and assets. ... [I]t was
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2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDI). "The roughly 3,000
taxpayers who came forward after the [2009 program] ended will be eligi-
ble for the terms of the new OVDI."96
Under the 2011 OVDI, individuals voluntarily disclosing offshore
bank accounts owed a 25 percent penalty on the highest aggregate ac-
count or asset balance from the years 2003-2010.7 For those who have
offshore accounts totaling less than $75,000, the penalty was reduced to
12.5%.98 Taxpayers could also qualify for a 5% penalty if (1) they did not
open the account, (2) had minimal contact with the account, (3) did not
withdraw more than $1000 in any year covered by the OVDI, and (4)
could establish that taxes were paid on the amounts they deposited.9 9 For-
eign residents who did not know they were U.S. citizens could also receive
the 5% penalty.10 0 Participants in the OVDI program also had to pay back
taxes and interest for up to eight years as well as paying applicable accu-
racy-related penalties, delinquency penalties, or both.10 ' The program
waived other penalties, including criminal prosecution.' 0 2 The program
was scheduled to expire on August 31, 2011, but was extended to Septem-
ber 9, 2011, due to Hurricane Irene.10 3
The 2011 program thus had a longer look-back period than the 2009
initiative did-eight years rather than six-so, taxpayers who did not par-
ticipate in 2009 but did in 2011 did not get a "pass" with respect to the
2003 and 2004 tax years. This also means that the period included is
determined that a similar initiative should be available to the large number of
taxpayers with offshore accounts and assets who applied to IRS Criminal Investiga-
tion's traditional voluntary disclosure practice since the October 15 deadline.").
96. Sapirie, supra note 78.
97. See IR-2011-14, supra note 9; IRS Releases 2011 FAQ supra note 67. The
latter document explains:
The offshore penalty is intended to apply to all of the taxpayer's off-
shore holdings that are related in any way to tax non-compliance....
The penalty applies to all assets directly owned by the taxpayer, including
financial accounts holding cash, securities or other custodial assets; tangi-
ble assets such as real estate or art; and intangible assets such as patents
or stock or other interests in a U.S. or foreign business. If such assets are
indirectly held or controlled by the taxpayer through an entity, the pen-
alty may be applied to the taxpayer's interest in the entity or, if the Ser-
vice determines that the entity is an alter ego or nominee of the taxpayer,
to the taxpayer's interest in the underlying assets. Tax noncompliance
includes failure to report income from the assets, as well as failure to pay
U.S. tax that was due with respect to the funds used to acquire the asset.
Id.
98. See id.
99. See Sapirie, supra note 78.
100. See id.
101. See IR-2011-14, supra note 9.
102. See id.




greater than the non-fraud statute of limitations periods. 104 In addition,
the general penalty rate in the 2011 program was five percentage points
higher than that of the 2009 initiative. The 2011 initiative introduced a
12.5% penalty and provided for more generous application of the 5% pen-
alty, but it extended the scope of both reduced penalties to participants in
the 2009 initiative,10 5 thereby avoiding disadvantaging taxpayers who
made a voluntary disclosure in 2009 rather than waiting until 2011.
In connection with the 2011 program, the IRS provided specific gui-
dance on "opting out" of the penalty structure. "Opting out" involves par-
ticipating in the initiative but making "an irrevocable election . . . to have
his or her case handled under the standard audit process."10 6 In other
words, under an opt-out, a taxpayer has the penalties determined on an
individual basis. While the one-size-fits-all penalties under the 2009 and
2011 programs are lower than what some taxpayers would face, they are
higher than the penalties imposed for a non-willful violation of the FBAR
requirements. One practitioner explained:
The [voluntary disclosure] penalty applied whether or not the
taxpayer knew about the requirement to report the foreign ac-
count. . . . The programs assume that just because the taxpayer
had unreported overseas assets, the taxpayer knew of his legal
obligation to report the overseas accounts and to file an FBAR, a
form many tax practitioners had not even heard of before 2008.
By opting out, a taxpayer takes the chance of a full audit and
penalties in excess of what is being offered in the voluntary dis-
closure program. Although the words "full audit" strike fear in
all taxpayers and tax professionals, those are chances worth tak-
ing when willfulness clearly does not exist.107
104. See I.R.C. § 6501(a) (West 2010) (providing general three-year period);
I.R.C. § 6501(e) (West 2010) (providing six-year period for substantial omission of
items). With respect to the eight-year lookback period in the 2012 initiative, one
practitioner stated:
I think many taxpayers who did not act willfully, have strong reasona-
ble cause arguments, and intend to opt out will reject the eight-year look-
back period-which covers closed years for many taxpayers-and the
required [statute of limitations] extensions, which the IRS cannot force
upon a taxpayer outside the settlement initiative.
Marie Sapirie, IRS Announces Open-Ended Third Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program,
TAx Noms TODAY, Jan. 10, 2012, at 6-1 (quoting tax practitioner Caroline D.
Ciraolo).
105. See IRS Updates FAQ on Second Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, TAX
Norzs TODAY, Aug. 25, 2011, at 165-14; see also Sapirie, supra note 75.
106. IRS Explains How to Handle Opt Outs from Civil Settlements Under Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives, TAx Noms TODAY, June 3, 2011, at 107-39.
107. Jeffrey A. Neiman, Opting Out: The Solution for the Non-Willful OVDI Tax-
payer, TAx NoTrs TODAY, Sept. 12, 2011, at 176-6.
516 [Vol. 57: p. 499
VOLUNTARY DIsCLOSURE INITIATIVES
Some practitioners praised the 2011 program as addressing concerns
raised by the previous initiative. 108 In 2011, The IRS reported that almost
12,000 taxpayers filed disclosures under the program.' 09 In early 2012,
the IRS reported that it had received 33,000 disclosures under the 2009
and 2011 initiatives."10
Perhaps because of the high volume of disclosures in 2009 and 2011,
and the fact that "[s]ince the 2011 program closed . .. hundreds of taxpay-
ers have come forward to make voluntary disclosures,"'' the IRS an-
nounced an additional offshore voluntary disclosure initiative in 2012.
The new initiative is very similar to the 2011 program, except that the
highest penalty rate was increased from 25% to 27.5%, and the program
was made indefinite.112 Thus, whenever taxpayers choose to come in
under the 2012 program, the penalty will apply to "the eight full tax years
prior to the disclosure."'" Therefore, it appears that waiting could re-
move early tax years from the calculus. The IRS did warn taxpayers, how-
ever, that "the terms of the program could change at any time going
forward. For example, the IRS may increase penalties in the program for
all or some taxpayers or defined classes of taxpayers-or decide to end the
program entirely at any point."114
III. ARE VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE INITIATIVES WORTHWHILE
FOR THE GOVERNMENT?
As discussed above, the IRS's voluntary disclosure initiatives are a
form of tax amnesty.1 5 Under all three offshore voluntary disclosure ini-
tiatives, the government waived certain penalties, including criminal ones,
in return for a disclosure of an undetected tax offense and payment of
back taxes for a period of time and some civil penalties. There is thus
compromise on both sides: The government collects more than it might
otherwise have but less than theoretically it is entitled to, just as it does
when it settles a civil tax liability through other means.
108. See Sapirie, supra note 78 ("Practitioners gave the announcement a warm
reception. . . . The new penalty structure of 25 percent plus amended returns
going back to 2003 'hits a good balance,' said Scott D. Michel, a partner at Caplin
& Drysdale.").
109. See Shamik Trivedi, Shulman Touts Success of OVDI, International Tax En-
forcement, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 16, 2011, at 180-2.





115. For a further discussion of how the voluntary disclosure initiatives are a
version of a tax amnesty, see supra notes 11-14, and accompanying text.
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A. The Characteristics of an Optimal Tax Amnesty
As with most compromises, tax amnesties have both benefits and
drawbacks. 16 In an article about offshore tax evasion, Professor Craig
Boise identified the benefits of tax amnesties as the collection of tax reve-
nue, encouragement of future tax compliance by taxpayers who partici-
pate in the amnesty, and easing a transition to a more stringent
enforcement regime." 7 The first two goals are analogous to the goals of
the Offer in Compromise program, under which the IRS may settle known
tax liabilities for less than the full amount owed."l 8 The third goal reflects
the fact that increased enforcement calls for a change in norms, and
amnesties are a form of transition relief. In the offshore context, the U.S.
government put a lot more people on notice about their tax obligations' 1 9
and accomplished major breakthroughs with respect to foreign bank se-
crecy, but attitudes do not change overnight.
Professor Boise explained in his article that tax amnesties have costs,
as well. Those costs include undermining the perceived fairness of the tax
system, diminishing the perceived seriousness of the crime of tax evasion,
and creating expectations of repeated amnesties that thereby undermine
ongoing compliance.12 0 In light of the pros and cons of tax amnesties,
Professor Boise developed a very useful list of characteristics for an opti-
mal tax amnesty. Such an amnesty should: (1) be accompanied by reform
that will discourage evasion in the future; (2) be accompanied by greater
enforcement; (3) be offered only once; (4) minimize perceptions of un-
fairness by not being offered to known tax evaders and waiving few penal-
ties, ideally only criminal prosecution; and (5) not be relied on principally
to raise revenue.121
In fleshing out these factors, Professor Boise points out that amnesties
accompanied by statutory or administrative reforms bring in more reve-
nue than those not accompanied by such reforms.'2 2 They also are more
likely to result in improved compliance.123 In part, that is because re-
116. See Boise, supra note 12, at 696-705.
117. See id. at 696-701.
118. The author thanks Keith Fogg for the Offer in Compromise analogy.
119. See IR-2012-5, supra note 10 ("The IRS recognizes that its success in off-
shore enforcement and in the disclosure programs has raised awareness related to
tax filing obligations. This includes awareness by dual citizens and others who may
be delinquent in filing, but owe no U.S. tax. The IRS is currently developing pro-
cedures by which these taxpayers may come into compliance with U.S. tax law.").
120. See Boise, supra note 12, at 701-05.
121. See id. at 705-11.
122. See id. at 705 (citing Ines Macho-Stadler et al., Tax Amnesties in a Dynamic
Model of Tax Evasion, 1 J. OF PuB. EcoN. THEORY 439, 441 (1999)); William M. Parle
& Mike W. Hirlinger, Evaluating the Use of Tax Amnesty by State Governments, 46 PuB.
ADMIN. REv. 246, 246 (1986)).
123. See Boise, supra note 12, at 705-06.
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forms may alter the incentives that led to the noncompliance in the first
place. 124
In this regard, an amnesty offered in conjunction with a transition to
increased enforcement of the laws subject to the amnesty may be particu-
larly effective at raising revenue.125 Publicity about the increased enforce-
ment is also important to increasing compliance. 126 That increases the
perceived likelihood that cheaters will be caught, and increases the incen-
tive to come clean during the amnesty. This also highlights the impor-
tance of timing; increased enforcement, such as criminal prosecutions,
and publicity about that enforcement, should precede an amnesty, so that
taxpayers are aware of a stick as well as a carrot.1 2 7
Conversely, repeated amnesties are well known to collect less reve-
nuel 28 and to threaten future compliance, as taxpayers perceive unfair-
ness and anticipate further amnesties.129 The result may well be
diminished compliance as taxpayers avoid being a "chump" complying
while others do not,130 and anticipate an opportunity to comply later at a
reduced cost.' 3 1
124. See id. at 705 ("After all, if the incentives within the tax system that
prompted the tax delinquency remain in place following the amnesty, there is min-
imal likelihood that tax evaders will change their behavior over the long-term.").
125. See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO Sr. L.J. 1453, 1465 (2003) ("[E]conomic models of tax com-
pliance counsel that increased audit rates and/or sanctions will increase compli-
ance. . . ."); cf Boise, supra note 12, at 706 (noting that "the failure of Argentina's
1987 amnesty to generate significant revenue was largely attributed to the fact that
it was not offered in conjunction with an increase in enforcement activity or any
reforms of that country's fiscal system").
126. See Boise, supra note 12, at 706-07 (explaining that "[h]eightened tax
enforcement efforts should be highly publicized in order to raise awareness among
taxpayers and obtain the maximum signaling benefit," and citing amnesties in Cal-
ifornia and New York as examples).
127. See Scott D. Michel & Mark E. Matthews, OVDI Is Over-What's Next for
Voluntary Disclosures, 133 TAX NoTEs 369, 371 (2011) ("If the IRS wants people to
come forward voluntarily, it needs to couple its VDP with well-publicized tax en-
forcement. . . . With the iron fist hammering away . .. thousands of people will
come forward."); cf Boise, supra note 12, at 707 ("[I]n the months leading up to
California's 1984-85 amnesty, the State projected a tough and high-profile image
on tax enforcement by publicizing criminal tax prosecutions and arrests, publicly
seizing boats and luxury cars, and auctioning unusual seized property. . . . The
State collected the fifth highest revenue total among states offering tax amnesties."
(footnote omitted)).
128. Boise, supra note 12, at 707 ("[E]vidence from both international amnes-
ties and amnesties offered by the states indicates that repeated amnesties generate
successively smaller amounts of revenue.").
129. See id. at 708.
130. See Lederman, supra note 125, at 1487.
131. See Boise, supra note 12, at 708 (referencing a study that found that "the
average level of compliance generally falls after an amnesty is given, and that this
decline is most likely a result of taxpayer expectations of future amnesties, or the
'anticipation effect"' (citing James Alm et al., Amazing Grace: Tax Amnesties and
Compliance, 43 NAT'L TAx J. 23, 24 (1990))).
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Similarly, a focus on the fairness of the amnesty to the taxpaying pub-
lic generally should help to minimize alienation and noncompliance by
others.1 s2 In addition, although Professor Boise does not focus on this,
the design of the amnesty should be such that it is internally fair. That
may mean treating differently situated taxpayers differently. One article
explains:
One large group of taxpayers in OVDI #1 comprised persons
whose foreign accounts were established by their parents or
other family members, with the assets passing by gift or inheri-
tance. Those taxpayers often had knowingly failed to disclose
their accounts to their return preparers, and thus they did not
report the accounts on FBARs or report the income on their re-
turns. Many of them had family stories involving the Holocaust
or political or economic oppression outside the United States.
The persons who had opened the accounts originally were often
foreign-born and had since died. The funds were rarely earned
in the United States, and our clients often relied entirely on non-
U.S. financial advisers.1 33
These taxpayers may not warrant the same penalty as taxpayers who
opened offshore bank accounts in an effort to evade taxes. 134
Finally, Professor Boise argues that "an optimal tax amnesty should
not be employed principally as a means to raise revenue." 135 In other
words, although the net revenue raised by an amnesty is highly relevant, ex
post, in evaluating the amnesty's effectiveness, revenue-raising should not
be the primary purpose of an amnesty ex ante. Instead, bringing taxpay-
ers into compliance should be.
Although an amnesty typically brings in a large amount of tax dollars
in a short time, it may raise less money than expected, particularly if it
follows other relatively recent tax amnesties.' 3 6 In addition, some of what
the government collects during an amnesty may have already been identi-
132. See id. at 709.
133. Michel & Matthews, supra note 127, at 373.
134. See id. ("To us (not to mention to our clients), that group was categori-
cally different than the core tax evader who skimmed funds from a business and
deposited them in an overseas account."). The IRS provides a 5% penalty for
some taxpayers in this situation. See id. ("While IRS guidance would have reduced
the penalty to 5 percent for some inherited or similar accounts, officials inter-
preted that guidance so narrowly that we joked about the mythical unicorn. We
suspect that out of the thousands of participants in OVDI #1, very few received that
5 percent safe harbor penalty, even though a large component of the program
involved inherited or gifted accounts.").
135. Boise, supra note 12, at 711.
136. See id. at 710 (providing examples by noting that "[a]mnesties in North
Dakota, Idaho, Texas, Kansas and Missouri each collected under $1 million." (cit-
ing Alm, supra note 131, at 34)).
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fied by the tax authorities.13 7 Amnesties also typically include a waiver of
penalties in order to make the amnesty attractive, and that may represent
forgone revenue.138 Moreover, it is difficult to determine the longer-term
effects of an amnesty, which may include deleterious effects on future
compliance.' 39
B. Evaluating the Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives
Professor Boise's framework provides a helpful context in which to
evaluate the IRS's offshore voluntary disclosure initiatives. Each of these
initiatives-and the four amnesties as a group-meet most, but not all, of
the factors developed by Professor Boise.
First, the voluntary disclosure initiatives were undertaken in conjunc-
tion with legislative and administrative reforms designed to target non-
compliance generally, and offshore evasion in particular. Some of these
efforts focus on increasing transparency of taxpayer information. Con-
gress enhanced the federal whistleblower statute in 2006,140 and, in con-
nection with its crackdown on offshore tax evasion, enacted FATCA. 141
The IRS also strengthened its international audit process, such as through
the credit card project it began in 2000.142 After September 11, 2001, the
IRS also entered into tax information exchange agreements (agreements
137. See id. (explaining that "while nearly 30% of the revenue collected by
New York as a result of its 1985-86 amnesty program was from tax liabilities for
which the state had no information, the remaining 70% likely would have been
collected anyway" (citing Bonnie G. Ross, Federal Tax Amnesty: Reflecting on the States'
Experiences, 40 TAx LAw. 145, 176 (1986))).
138. See id. at 711 (" [W]hatever short-term revenue gains are realized from a
tax amnesty also will be reduced to the extent that the amnesty carries with it a
waiver of penalties, which is the central attraction of most tax amnesty
programs.").
139. See id. (noting that " [a] comprehensive 1995 study that evaluated Indian
amnesties offered between 1965 and 1995 found that for all but a single amnesty,
the adverse indirect effects overwhelmed the direct amnesty receipts" (citing
Arindam Das-Gupta & Dilip Mookhejee, Tax Amnesties in India: An Empirical Evalu-
ation (Ctr. for Institutional Reform & the Informal Sector, Working Paper No. 4,
1995))).
140. See I.R.C. § 7623(b) (2006); Tax Relief and Healthcare Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-432, § 406(a), 120 Stat. 2922 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 62,
7443A, 7623 (2006)) (amending section 7623, among others, of Internal Revenue
Code to add awards for whistleblowers); see also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative
Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REv. 431, 459-60 (2008) (explaining 2006 changes
under statute, including creation of IRS Whistleblower Office).
141. For a further discussion of FATCA, see supra notes 82-90 and accompa-
nying text. The government also recently enacted a series of new information re-
porting requirements, in recognition of the fact that information reporting by
third parties substantially increases compliance. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing
Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78
FoRDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1736, 1742-52 (2010) (discussing three recently enacted
information reporting provisions).
142. For a further discussion of the credit card project, see supra notes 30-35
and accompanying text.
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with a foreign government to exchange tax and other financial informa-
tion) with countries with which it had not previously had such an
agreement. 143
Second, all of the voluntary disclosure initiatives were accompanied
by greater enforcement of the relevant tax laws. In fact, they have gener-
ally been in conjunction with special enforcement initiatives, as in the case
of the crackdown on Swiss bank accounts. Moreover, those enforcement
initiatives have been well publicized-a factor that is helpful in disseminat-
ing information about the increased enforcement.1 4 4
However, the timing of enforcement in relation to the voluntary dis-
closure programs was not always ideal. Criminal tax prosecutions, in par-
ticular, tend to spur increased compliance. 14 5 Criminal prosecution and
143. See William M. Sharp, Sr. & Hale E. Sheppard, Privilege, Work-Product Doc-
trine, and Other Discovery Defenses in U.S. IRS's International Tax Enforcement, 32 TAX
NOTES INT'L 377, 394 (2003) ("[I]mmediately following the September 11 trage-
dies, the IRS has executed a number of TIEAs in its effort to curtail what it consid-
ers abusive international tax transactions and also to counter global terrorism.
The United States has recently executed TIEAs with the Cayman Islands, the Baha-
mas, the British Virgin Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, the Netherlands Antilles,
Guernsey, the Isle of Man, and Jersey, and several others are under negotia-
tion.").Tax information exchange agreements are a somewhat limited tool, how-
ever. See Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and
the Future of the International Tax Regime, 84 TUL. L. REV. 125, 136 (2009) ("Like
[double-tax] treaties, TIEAs employ a structure that assigns reciprocal rights and
obligations between pairs of states. . . . Although TIEAs are formally reciprocal,
because they typically exist between states that are profoundly different, their nom-
inal symmetry tends to be illusory. In practice, one state is likely to need extraterri-
torial tax information covered by the TIEA while the other does not."); see also
Hearing on Banking Secrecy Practices and Wealthy American Taxpayers: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 69 (2009) (statement of Reuven S. Avi-
Yonhan, Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School)
("[E]xisting tax information exchange agreements, while helpful and important in
some cases, are of limited value in closing the overall international tax gap.").
144. See Boise, supra note 12, at 706-07 (referring to publicity campaigns by
New York and California, and the relative success of their amnesties); see also Marie
Sapirie, News Analysis: More Written Guidance Needed as OVDI Deadline Nears, TAX
NOTEs TODAY, Aug. 30, 2011, at 168-1 ("Interest in the OVDI has spiked in recent
weeks after a slow initial response from taxpayers with offshore accounts to the
announcement of the new program. Practitioners speculate that recent develop-
ments such as the announcement of the investigation of Credit Suisse Group in
July and the renewed interest of the foreign press in the OVDI are contributing
factors to the last-minute rush.").
145. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Publ'n 1916 (Rev. 11-96), THE DETERMI-
NANTS OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE: ESTIMATING THE IMPACTS OF TAX
POLICY, ENFORCEMENT, AND IRS RESPONSIVENESS 36 (1996) (copy of Ph.D disserta-
tion proposal of Alan H. Plumley, Harvard University, slightly modified for distri-
bution by Internal Revenue Service) (finding that states with higher number of
criminal tax convictions per census population had higher reporting compliance);
see also Michel & Matthews, supra note 127 (" [P]ractitioners have been consulted
for decades by clients wishing to initiate voluntary disclosures arising from un-
declared offshore accounts or countless other instances of tax noncompliance, but
before 2008 those were all largely one-offs. When the enforcement apparatus of
the DOJ Tax Division and IRS CI kicked in, taxpayers came into OVDI #1 in
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conviction of offshore tax evaders-particularly if they are both numerous
and publicized-should therefore be an effective way to encourage simi-
larly situated taxpayers to pursue voluntary disclosure. Most of the crimi-
nal prosecutions came after the 2003 voluntary disclosure initiative.1 46
Even the 2009 and 2011 initiatives, though much more successful, pre-
ceded many indictments, prosecutions, and publicity suggesting that the
U.S. government was going after more than UBS bank account holders. 147
In that regard, the IRS's announcement in early 2012 of an additional,
and indefinite, initiative is not surprising.
Of course, these repeated voluntary disclosure regimes violate Profes-
sor Boise's criterion that an optimal amnesty should only be offered once.
The 2012 program is the third in a series since 2009 of amnesties focusing
on offshore bank accounts and other assets.148 Moreover, it is actually the
fourth offshore voluntary disclosure program since 2003.149 It is possible
that the 2003 initiative reached a slightly different group of taxpayers from
the later initiatives, however. Although the 2003 program was designed to
reach "taxpayers who used 'offshore' payment cards or other offshorefinan-
cial arrangements to hide their income,"1 5 0 it was closely connected with the
payment card enforcement effort that preceded it.'5 1 By contrast, the
2009 and 2011 programs, though of general applicability to offshore non-
compliance, 5 2 were closely linked with the crackdown on offshore bank
accounts.I" The 2012 program was announced soon after the close of the
2011 program and is designed in a similar fashion. 1 54 Nonetheless, since
droves. With every media report of an indictment against bankers and investment
advisers or rumors of investigations into other banks, there was a noticeable uptick
in contacts from potential clients.").
146. For a further discussion of increased criminal prosecution after the 2003
initiative, see supra notes 51, 70-75 and accompanying text.
147. For a further discussion of increased enforcement after the 2009 and
2011 initiatives, see supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
148. See IR-2012-5, supra note 10 ("The IRS reopened the Offshore Voluntary
Disclosure Program (OVDP) following continued strong interest from taxpayers
and tax practitioners after the closure of the 2011 and 2009 programs.").
149. For a further discussion of recent voluntary disclosure programs, see
supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
150. IR-2003-5, supra note 36, at 1 (emphasis added).
151. For further discussion of the previous payment card information effort,
see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
152. See IRS Issues Memorandum, supra note 67 (noting that 2009 program ap-
plied to "voluntary disclosure requests containing offshore issues"); IR-2011-14,
supra note 9 (2011 initiative was "designed to bring offshore money back into the
U.S. tax system and help people with undisclosed income from hidden offshore
accounts get current with their taxes.").
153. For further discussion of 2009 and 2011 initiatives, see supra notes 42-51
and accompanying text.
154. See IR-2012-5, supra note 10 (referring to the "continued strong interest
from taxpayers and tax practitioners after the closure of the 2011 and 2009 pro-
grams" and stating that "[t]he program is similar to the 2011 program in many
ways, but with a few key differences" relating to top penalty and lack of specific
deadline).
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all four initiatives focused on offshore tax evasion, there is substantial over-
lap among them.
Professor Boise pointed out that repeated tax amnesties bear the risk
of raising considerably less revenue and undermining future compli-
ance. 15 5 However, Boise's article does not focus on the specific design of
successive amnesties. To its credit, the IRS has raised the general penalty
level with each voluntary disclosure initiative, which should help discour-
age non-compliers inclined to wait for a better "deal." However, in its
most recent initiative, the IRS raised the penalty only slightly-from 25%
to 27.5%-and provided the same eight-year window as the 2011 program.
With no deadline to apply, taxpayers with high account or asset values in
early years in the eight-year window could wait to apply until those years
are out of the window, to receive a lower penalty. Of course, the IRS
stated that it could change the terms of the 2012 program or end it at any
time,156 but the problem is that repeated amnesties undermine the credi-
bility of this threat.
There is also a risk that compliant taxpayers might feel like chumps in
the face of a series of highly publicized voluntary disclosure programs.
However, criminal prosecutions of taxpayers who come in voluntarily, cou-
pled with the relatively high (and increasing) level of penalties included in
the recent initiatives, should help reduce that risk. In addition, the volun-
tary disclosure initiatives generally were not open to known evaders, but
rather only to taxpayers whose evasion was not already known to the
IRS.15 7 The "last chance" letters the IRS sent to taxpayers in 2003 after
the expiration of the program are an exception because those taxpayers
were known to the IRS to be potentially eligible to participate in the off-
shore initiative. Allowing taxpayers already in the IRS's sights to opt in
late to an amnesty program may increase the revenue from that program
but it does not send a strong enforcement message. Fortunately, the IRS
has not repeated this approach with subsequent amnesties.
With respect to Professor Boise's fourth factor, the voluntary disclo-
sure initiatives do seem intended to raise revenue. However, that is not
their only goal. One article explains the two goals of the 2011 initiative as
155. See Boise, supra note 12, at 707-08.
156. See IR-2012-5, supra note 10.
157. See Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-1 C.B. 311, § 4.01(1) (2003), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-03-11.pdf (noting that taxpayer's request to
participate in 2003 program must have been received before any of four different
events occurred, including beginning of IRS audit or criminal investigation of tax-
payer); 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Frequently Asked Questions and An-
swers, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/businesses/international/article/,,id=235699,00.
html (last updated Aug. 29, 2011) ("If the IRS has initiated a civil examination,
regardless of whether it relates to undisclosed foreign accounts or undisclosed for-
eign entities, the taxpayer will not be eligible to come in under the 2011 OVDI.");
see also Parillo & Coder, supra note 66 ("The reduced penalty scheme will be availa-
ble only to taxpayers whose disclosure meets the 'voluntary' requirements set out
in Internal Revenue Manual 9.5.11.9.").
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"to (1) incentivize noncompliant, eligible taxpayers to become compliant
by setting forth a circumscribed and favorable penalty framework, as evi-
denced by the much reduced FBAR penalty compared to that of current
law and (2) to recoup lost tax revenues."15 8 Thus, the revenue-raising
goal may not be the government's principal motivation, consistent with
Professor Boise's recommendation. In addition, the fact that the IRS in-
creased the penalty level with each initiative seems reflective of a desire
not to maximize short-term revenue at the expense of long-term compli-
ance and is thus consistent with a program design that balances factors
other than short-term collections.
Ultimately, the success of these amnesties will depend in part on their
net collections and on whether they succeed in reducing the amount of
offshore evasion in the future, which, in turn, likely depends in large part
on the effectiveness and publicity surrounding criminal prosecutions. Un-
like the Offer in Compromise program, under which taxpayers agree to be
compliant for the next five years,15 9 or risk having the IRS try to collect
the full amount that was settled,1 6 0 the voluntary disclosure regimes do
not require any representations about future compliance.1st However,
the voluntary disclosure programs are designed to allow taxpayers to come
into compliance with respect to offshore assets and thereby be able to re-
patriate the funds in those accounts. To the extent taxpayers do that, they
will not be relying on foreign bank secrecy laws to shield those amounts
from the IRS in the future.
The longer-term effects the voluntary disclosure initiatives will have
on compliance are much harder to measure than their short-term effects.
The 2003 initiative may not have raised revenue, net of costs, even in the
158. Alan W. Granwell et al., IRS Issues Voluntary Disclosure Guidance for Unre-
ported Offshore Accounts and Entities, 9 PRAc. U.S./DOMESTIc TAx STRATEGIEs, Apr.
2009, at 2, 9, available at http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Publication/95e03d3b-70
60-4562-b72d-a46fea0aa4b5/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5e2a2645-f236-
4863-8e9e-c85fec262f48/DomTaxO4O9.pdf.
159. See I.R.S. Form 656 (Offer in Compromise) (Mar. 2011) at 3, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f656.pdf (requiring taxpayer to agree to state-
ment, "I will file tax returns and pay required taxes for the five year period begin-
ning with the date of acceptance of this offer, or until my offer is paid in full,
whichever is longer. If this is an offer being submitted for joint tax debt, and one
of us does not comply with future obligations, only the non-compliant taxpayer will
be in default of this agreement.").
160. See id. ("If I fail to meet any of the terms of this offer, the IRS may levy or
sue me to collect any amount ranging from the unpaid balance of the offer to the
original amount of the tax debt without further notice of any kind. The IRS will
continue to add interest, as Section 6601 of the Internal Revenue Code requires,
on the amount the IRS determines is due after default. The IRS will add interest
from the date I default until I completely satisfy the amount owed.").
161. See Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-1 C.B. 311 (2003 initiative), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rp-03-1 1.pdf; IRS Issues Memorandum, supra note
67 (2009 initiative); IR-2011-14, supra note 9 (2011 initiative).
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short term,162 though it seems to have signaled to offshore evaders that
the IRS had them in its sights, and laid the groundwork for future offshore
enforcement and voluntary disclosure initiatives. The 2009 voluntary dis-
closure program reportedly raised the much higher amount of $2.2 bil-
lion, according to the IRS.163
It is too soon to tell how much revenue the 2011 disclosure program
will raise, though early indications are positive, and the IRS reported in
early 2012 that it had collected "$1 billion from up front payments re-
quired under the 2011 program."164 Perhaps most important, in conjunc-
tion with its overall crackdown on offshore tax evasion, including criminal
prosecutions, the 2009 and 2011 voluntary compliance initiatives have pro-
vided some cause for optimism:
It's clear that the 2009 offshore voluntary disclosure program
(OVDP) and the 2011 OVDI were huge successes. Tens of
thousands of Americans participated in the programs. The IRS
collected billions of dollars in unpaid taxes, interest, and penal-
ties. Undeclared assets have been reported to the IRS and will be
taxed for years to come. The landscape in tax enforcement has
forever changed, and the Justice Department and IRS have bro-
ken the back of bank secrecy and obtained a treasure-trove of
information that will provide fodder for criminal and civil investi-
gations for the next 10 years.165
Of course, as with any amnesty, it is hard to determine what effect it
will have on taxpayer behavior in the longer term. Some newly compliant
taxpayers may stay compliant, reporting earnings on offshore funds, as the
IRS hopes.16 6 Other people may invest more resources in evasion, increas-
ing enforcement costs for the IRS. One practitioner, Robert McKenzie,
[F]ound that while the vast majority of potential clients calling
him have taken affirmative steps to create their offshore arrange-
ments, the actual numbers of clients retaining him are more
evenly split, with 40 percent seeking to disclose inherited ac-
counts. From this, McKenzie concludes that those who have "af-
162. For further discussion of the 2003 initiative, see supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
163. See Trivedi, supra note 109.
164. IR-2012-5, supra note 10.
165. Neiman, supra note 107.
166. See Internal Revenue Serv., Taxpayers Face August 31 Deadline to Come Clean
Under Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Aug. 9, 2011, at 153-
6 ("'The time has come to get back into compliance with the U.S. tax system,
because the risks of hiding money offshore keeps going up,' said IRS Commis-
sioner Doug Shulman. 'Our goal is to get people back into the system."'); Strategic
Priorities, supra note 70 ("Collecting additional revenue for past misdeeds-as im-
portant as that may be-is not the main consideration here. It's equally important
that we're bringing U.S. taxpayers back into the system . . . back into compli-
ance . .. so they properly report and pay their taxes for years to come.").
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firmatively taken steps are not as prone to decide to come into
the voluntary disclosure program."1 6 7
Another practitioner, Martin Press, termed this group the "risk-takers."1 68
"This group is engaged in skimming or otherwise not reporting income
received in industries such as international trade. Press said he believed
that people in this group are the least likely to come forward under volun-
tary disclosure."' 6 9 These practitioners' experiences suggest that the IRS
may be primarily collecting the low-hanging fruit:
"Given the difficulties the IRS has had in obtaining quality infor-
mation on the accounts in question, including the UBS cases, it
suggests to us that even fewer high-income taxpayers will come
forward under the harsher [2011] initiative," [Gregory S.]
Lynam [of the Ferraro Law Firm] said. "While it is great that the
IRS is stepping up use of all of its enforcement tools, there is a
danger that the IRS may focus on the little fish that voluntarily
swim into the net."17 0
Amnesties alone probably will never bring in the risk-takers. To tar-
get them, increased global financial transparency and criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions seem to be key. As the government makes strides
in those regards, its announcement of the 2012 voluntary disclosure initia-
tive so soon after the end of the last one suggests that it thinks the risk
calculus is changing. But it remains to be seen how successful the new
program will be, and for what period of time.
IV. CONCLUSION
In recent years, the government has marshaled its forces in its battle
against offshore tax evasion. Its well-publicized crackdown on the use of
secret bank accounts appears to have encouraged a number of taxpayers
to participate in the voluntary disclosure initiatives it has offered. The IRS
structured the 2011 and 2012 offshore initiatives both to respond to con-
cerns expressed by practitioners and to assure that taxpayers who waited to
come in did not face a lower penalty structure than those who made a
disclosure under an earlier initiative.
Repeated use of voluntary disclosure initiatives will likely result in di-
minishing returns, however. The IRS has wisely increased the general
penalty each time, rather than offering the same or more attractive terms,
which would encourage non-compliers to wait for a better deal, as well as
undermining taxpayers' perceptions of the fairness of the federal income
tax system generally and the offshore compliance effort in particular. The
167. Stewart, supra note 5.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Sapirie, supra note 78.
2012] 527
528 VILLANOVA LAw REVIEW [Vol. 57: p. 499
IRS may have concluded that it has reached the limit on penalties for the
moment, in that it has no specific deadline under the 2012 program. The
lack of a deadline, however, may allow taxpayers to strategically time their
disclosure to leave early years outside the eight-year window, where those
are years with higher account or asset values.
Moreover, many of the taxpayers who have not already taken advan-
tage of an offshore disclosure initiative may be "risk-takers" engaged in
willful evasion who are gambling on continuing to go undetected. In light
of this dynamic, the government's best bet is to continue to press forward
with obtaining names of U.S. account holders in jurisdictions with strong
bank secrecy laws and to prosecute tax evaders criminally when
appropriate.
